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TRUE BELIEF: AN ANALYSIS OF THE DEFINITION OF
“KNOWLEDGE” IN THE WASHINGTON CRIMINAL
CODE
Alan R. Hancock*
INTRODUCTION
In State v. Allen,1 the Washington State Supreme Court reaffirmed
State v. Shipp,2 holding that in order for a defendant to have
“knowledge” for purposes of the Washington Criminal Code, the
defendant must have actual, subjective knowledge of the fact in issue.3
However, glaring problems still remain with the statutory definition of
the term “knowledge.”
The Criminal Code defines “knowledge” in two alternative ways. The
first prong states that a person knows or acts knowingly or with
knowledge when “he or she is aware of a fact, facts, or circumstances or
result described by a statute defining an offense.”4 The second prong of
the definition states that a person knows or acts knowingly or with
knowledge when “he or she has information which would lead a
reasonable person in the same situation to believe that facts exist which
facts are described by a statute defining an offense.”5
Consider, for example, the crime of possessing stolen property.6 The
term “possessing stolen property” is defined as “knowingly to receive,
retain, possess, conceal, or dispose of stolen property knowing that it has
been stolen and to withhold or appropriate the same to the use of any
person other than the true owner or person entitled thereto.”7 Thus, one
* Alan R. Hancock is a Washington State Superior Court Judge for Island County. He received his
Bachelor of Arts degree, magna cum laude, from Western Washington University (1973), where he
majored in Philosophy, and received his Juris Doctor degree from the University of Washington
School of Law (1976).
1. 182 Wash. 2d 364, 341 P.3d 268 (2015).
2. 93 Wash. 2d 510, 610 P.2d 1322 (1980).
3. See Allen, 182 Wash. 2d at 374, 341 P.3d at 273.
4. WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.08.010(1)(b)(i) (2014 & Supp. 2015) (emphasis added).
5. Id. § 9A.08.010(1)(b)(ii) (emphasis added).
6. This crime may be committed in any of three different degrees. See id. §§ 9A.56.150–.170.
7. Id. § 9A.56.140(1).
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of the elements of the crime is that the defendant must “know” that the
property has been stolen. Under the first prong of the definition of
“knowledge,” the defendant could be found to have such “knowledge”
only if he or she had actual awareness of the fact that the property was
stolen. But under the second prong of the definition, the defendant could
seemingly be found to have such “knowledge” if he or she had
information that would lead a reasonable person in the same situation to
believe that the property was stolen, even though he or she had no actual
awareness that the property was stolen.
Read literally, the second prong of the statutory definition of
“knowledge” in the Criminal Code is unconstitutional; it violates the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment because it does not
provide citizens with adequate notice of what the law requires.8
However, to avoid declaring the statute unconstitutional on its face, the
Washington State Supreme Court interpreted this statute to mean that it
permits, but does not direct, the finder of fact “to find that the defendant
had knowledge if it finds that the ordinary person would have had
knowledge under the circumstances. The jury must still be allowed to
conclude that he [or she] was less attentive or intelligent than the
ordinary person.”9 In any case, the finder of fact “must still find
subjective knowledge.”10 Despite the holdings in Shipp and Allen, other
case law and the pattern jury instruction defining “knowledge” still
literally permit the jury to find the defendant guilty based on
constructive knowledge.
There is a related problem connected with the definition of
“knowledge.” The Washington State Supreme Court has held that a
defendant can be found to have “knowledge” even though the supposed
“fact” that he or she “knew” was not even true.11 This is directly
contrary to the definition,12 which requires awareness of a fact, which by
definition is a proposition that is true.
Thus, it is no exaggeration to say that a criminal defendant can
currently be found to have acted with knowledge, and therefore be found
guilty of a crime, even though the defendant had no awareness of the
fact he or she allegedly knew, and even though the “fact” he or she
8. See Allen, 182 Wash. 2d at 374, 341 P.3d at 273; State v. Shipp, 93 Wash. 2d 510, 513–16,
610 P.2d 1322, 1324–26 (1980).
9. Shipp, 93 Wash. 2d at 516, 610 P.2d at 1326.
10. Id. at 517, 610 P.2d at 1326 (emphasis added); see also Allen, 182 Wash. 2d at 374–75, 341
P.3d at 273.
11. State v. Johnson, 119 Wash. 2d 167, 829 P.2d 1082 (1992).
12. WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.08.010(1).
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supposedly “knew” was not even true. This is untenable; the law must
change.
The Legislature should amend the statute defining “knowledge” to
eliminate the second prong of the definition. The second prong adds
nothing useful to the first prong of the definition, and only causes
confusion. The case law construing the statute has only added to the
confusion. In addition, or in the alternative, the Washington Pattern Jury
Instruction Committee should amend Criminal Washington Pattern Jury
Instruction (WPIC) § 10.02 to eliminate the second prong of the
definition.
I.

THE SECOND PRONG OF WASHINGTON’S DEFINITION OF
“KNOWLEDGE” SETS FORTH AN UNCONSTITUTIONAL
NEGLIGENCE STANDARD

What is knowledge? In epistemological circles, knowledge is
generally defined as justified true belief.13 In other words, in order for a
person to have knowledge of a given proposition, the proposition must
be true, the person must believe it to be true, and the person must be
justified in believing it to be true.14
The first prong of the definition of “knowledge” in the Criminal Code
appears to define knowledge in terms of true belief, without any
reference to what we might call justification for such true belief.15 It
states that “[a] person knows or acts knowingly or with knowledge
when: (i) he or she is aware of a fact, facts, or circumstances or result
described by a statute defining an offense.”16 This definition uses the
term awareness rather than belief, and this is a reasonable synonym
under the circumstances. Awareness connotes perception and
consciousness, and certainly implies belief. The definition refers to
awareness of a fact, facts, or circumstances. These terms necessarily
13. See, e.g., RODERICK M. CHISHOLM, THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE 5–23 (1966). Chisholm
formulates the elements of knowledge as follows: “S knows at t that h is true, provided: (1) S
believes h at t; (2) h is true; and (3) h is evident at t for S.” Id. at 23. The term “evident” is a term of
art in this context, which Chisholm explains in detail. It is roughly equivalent to the concept of
being justified in one’s true belief.
14. In a famous paper, the philosopher Edmund L. Gettier III showed, by way of some ingenious
counterexamples, that a person can have justified true belief of a proposition, and still not have
knowledge of that proposition. Edmund L. Gettier, Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?, 23
ANALYSIS 121 (1963). Still, as a rule of thumb, justified true belief is a good working definition of
knowledge. Chisholm adds a qualification to his definition of “knowledge” in order to account for
Gettier’s point. CHISHOLM, supra note 13, at 23.
15. WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.08.010(1)(b)(i).
16. Id.
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imply the truth of the proposition the person is aware of. A fact by
definition is something that is true.17
When we turn to the second prong of the definition of “knowledge,”
however, we encounter a definition that is not only contrary to an
ordinary understanding of the concept of knowledge, but also contrary to
well-established principles of criminal law. The second prong of the
definition of “knowledge” is as follows:
A person knows or acts knowingly or with knowledge when:
...
(ii) he or she has information which would lead a reasonable
person in the same situation to believe that facts exist which
facts are described by a statute defining an offense.18
This reasonable person standard was part of the original Washington
Criminal Code, Title 9A of the Revised Code of Washington, enacted in
1975, to become effective in 1976.19 The Criminal Code was a
combination of a revised criminal code prepared by the Judiciary
Committee of the Washington Legislative Council, which drew on the
Model Penal Code,20 and a criminal code drafted by the Washington
Association of Prosecuting Attorneys.21
The Model Penal Code defines the term “knowingly” as follows:
A person acts knowingly with respect to a material element of
an offense when:
(i) if the element involves the nature of his [or her] conduct or
the attendant circumstances, he [or she] is aware that his [or her]
conduct is of that nature or that such circumstances exist; and
(ii) if the element involves a result of his [or her] conduct, he [or
she] is aware that it is practically certain that his [or her] conduct
will cause such a result.22
Both parts of this definition are consistent with the ordinary
understanding of the term “knowledge,” in that they both refer to the
person’s awareness of the person’s conduct, the attendant circumstances,
17. It was not unreasonable for the Legislature to exclude any consideration of justification for
the actor’s awareness of facts in defining “knowledge.” After all, the focus of the criminal law is on
the state of mind of the actor, as well as the acts of the actor.
18. WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.08.010(1)(b)(ii) (emphasis added).
19. An Act Relating to Crimes and Criminal Procedure, 1975 Wash. Sess. Laws 826.
20. See MODEL PENAL CODE (AM. LAW INST. 1962).
21. See Recent Developments, Criminal Law—Affirmative Defenses in the Washington Criminal
Code—The Impact of Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684 (1975), 51 WASH. L. REV. 953, 954–55
n.10 (1976).
22. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(b).
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or the result of the person’s conduct, as the case may be, which roughly
equates to true belief.23 The definition also avoids any concept of
constructive knowledge.24
In stark contrast, the second prong of the definition of “knowledge” in
the Washington Criminal Code essentially sets forth a negligence
standard for determining whether a person has knowledge of a given
fact. Civil Washington Pattern Jury Instruction § 10.01 sets forth the
most common legal definition of negligence:
Negligence is the failure to exercise ordinary care. It is the doing
of some act that a reasonably careful person would not do under
the same or similar circumstances or the failure to do some act
that a reasonably careful person would have done under the
same or similar circumstances.25
There is a striking similarity between the definition of “negligence”
and the second prong of the definition of “knowledge.” Consider, for
example, a situation in which a defendant is charged with possessing
stolen property.26 One of the elements of this crime is that the defendant
“knew” that the property he or she possessed had been stolen.27 Under
the second prong of the definition of “knowledge,” the defendant could
be held to have such knowledge if he or she had information that would
lead a reasonable person in the same situation to believe that the
property had been stolen.28 Under these circumstances, the defendant has
acted negligently, i.e., he or she has failed to become aware of the fact
that the property had been stolen; a reasonably careful person would
have become aware of this fact.
A.

The Washington Courts Have Held that “Knowledge” Requires
Actual Knowledge; Constructive Knowledge Is Insufficient

Shipp and Allen address the legal defect in the second prong of the
definition of “knowledge.” Three cases were consolidated for hearing

23. As previously noted, it would not be necessary to include the concept of justification in a
criminal code definition of “knowledge.”
24. In the law, “constructive knowledge” is generally understood to be knowledge imputed to a
person who should have been aware of a fact if the person had exercised reasonable care. See, e.g.,
Constructive knowledge, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 950 (9th ed. 2009).
25. 6 WASH. PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS: CIVIL § 10.01 (2014) (emphasis added).
26. This crime may be committed in any of three different degrees. See WASH. REV. CODE §§
9A.56.150–.170 (2014 & Supp. 2015).
27. Id. § 9A.56.140(1) (2014 & Supp. 2015).
28. Id. § 9A.08.010(1)(b)(ii).

Hancock_Final.docx (Do Not Delete)

182

WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW ONLINE

3/7/2016 4:57 PM

[Vol. 91:177

before the Supreme Court in Shipp.29 In two of these cases, the issue was
whether a jury instruction tracking the language of the second prong of
the definition of “knowledge” was lawful and constitutional.30 The Court
held that such an instruction is not lawful and constitutional because it
redefines the accepted meaning of the term “knowledge” to mean
negligent ignorance: “[t]he ordinary person reading one of the criminal
statutes would surely be misled if the statute defining knowledge were
interpreted to effect such a drastic change in meaning.”31 The Court’s
citations indicate that it was basing this ruling on the Due Process Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment.32 The Court remanded these two cases
for new trials.33 Shipp mandates that different jury instructions must be
given.
As the Court pointed out in Shipp: “[k]nowledge is intended to be a
more culpable mental state than recklessness, which is a subjective
standard, rather than the equivalent of negligence, which is an objective
standard.”34 Thus, if the jury is permitted to find that the defendant acted
knowingly if “he or she has information which would lead a reasonable
person in the same situation to believe that facts exist which facts are
described by a statute defining an offense,”35 the jury would, in effect, be
permitted to find knowledge if it finds the defendant negligent in not
being aware of the relevant fact or facts. This is unacceptable because
acting with mere negligence is not sufficient to establish criminal
liability.36 Even the definition of “criminal negligence” provides that the
actor’s failure to be aware of a substantial risk that a wrongful act may
occur must constitute “a gross deviation from the standard of care that a
reasonable person would exercise in the same situation.”37

29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.

State v. Shipp, 93 Wash. 2d 510, 512, 610 P.2d 1332, 1324 (1980).
Id. at 512–13, 610 P.2d at 1324.
Id. at 516, 610 P.2d at 1326.
Id.
Id. at 517, 610 P.2d at 1326.
Id. at 515, 610 P.2d at 1325.
WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.08.010(1)(b)(ii) (2014 & Supp. 2015).
Shipp, 93 Wash. 2d at 515–16, 610 P.2d at 1325–26. Compare 6 WASH. PATTERN JURY
INSTRUCTIONS: CIVIL § 10.01 (2014) (“Negligence is the failure to exercise ordinary care. It is the
doing of some act that a reasonably careful person would not do under the same or similar
circumstances or the failure to do some act that a reasonably careful person would have done under
the same or similar circumstances.”), with 11 WASH. PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS: CRIMINAL
§ 10.04 (2014) (“A person is criminally negligent or acts with criminal negligence when he or she
fails to be aware of a substantial risk that may occur and this failure constitutes a gross deviation
from the standard of care that a reasonable person would exercise in the same situation.”).
37. WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.08.010(1)(d) (emphasis added).
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In Shipp, the Court correctly recognized the aforementioned problems
with the second prong of the definition of “knowledge.”38 First, it
rejected any interpretation of this definition that would require the jury
to follow a mandatory presumption that knowledge exists where a
reasonable person in the same situation would have knowledge. 39
Second, it rejected any interpretation that would permit the jury to find
knowledge based on the reasonable person standard if the jury believed
that the defendant “was so unperceptive or inattentive that [the
defendant] did not have knowledge in the ordinary sense.”40 The Court
pointed out that this second interpretation “redefines knowledge with an
objective standard which is the equivalent of negligent ignorance,” a
redefinition that is “inconsistent with the statutory scheme which creates
a hierarchy of mental states for crimes of increasing culpability.”41
However, the Court salvaged the legality of the second prong of the
definition of “knowledge.” The Court held that
the statute must be interpreted as only permitting, rather than
directing, the jury to find that the defendant had knowledge if it
finds that the ordinary person would have had knowledge under
the circumstances. The jury must still be allowed to conclude
that [the defendant] was less attentive or intelligent than the
ordinary person.42
The Court further pointed out that “[t]he jury must still find subjective
knowledge.”43
Allen underscores the problematic language of the second prong of
the “knowledge” definition.44 In that case, the Court reaffirmed that “the
State was required to prove that Allen actually knew that he was
promoting or facilitating Clemmons [the principal in the murder of four
Lakewood police officers] in the commission of first degree

38. Shipp, 93 Wash. 2d at 515, 610 P.2d at 1325.
39. Id. at 514, 610 P.2d at 1325.
40. Id. The Shipp Court referred to what it called “subjective knowledge,” and clearly intended
this to mean actual knowledge in the sense that the person with knowledge believed, or was aware
of, the fact, facts, or circumstances or result in question. Id. at 513–17. Actual or subjective
knowledge is to be distinguished from constructive knowledge, i.e., knowledge imputed to a person
who should have been aware of a fact if the person had exercised reasonable care. See supra note
24. In this sense, the second prong of the statutory definition can be characterized as a definition of
constructive knowledge, as the Court noted in Allen. State v. Allen, 182 Wash. 2d 364, 374, 341
P.3d 268, 273 (2015).
41. Shipp, 93 Wash. 2d at 515, 610 P.2d at 1325.
42. Id. at 516, 610 P.2d at 1326.
43. Id. at 517, 610 P.2d at 1326 (emphasis added).
44. See WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.08.010(1)(b)(ii) (2014 & Supp. 2015).
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premeditated murder.”45 The Court correctly cited Shipp for this
proposition.46 One of the issues in Allen was whether the prosecutor had
engaged in prosecutorial misconduct in closing argument by misstating
the “knowledge” standard upon which the jury could convict the
defendant. The Court held that the prosecutor had done so by repeatedly
arguing “that the jury could convict Allen if it found that he should have
known Clemmons was going to murder the four police officers.”47
While the Court reached the correct result in Allen, it did not directly
address the highly problematic language of the second prong of the
definition of “knowledge.” And it added to the confusion by stating:
While the State must prove actual knowledge, it may do so
through circumstantial evidence. Thus, Washington’s culpability
statute provides that a person has actual knowledge when “he or
she has information which would lead a reasonable person in the
same situation to believe” that he was promoting or facilitating
the crime eventually charged.48
Therein lies one of the problems addressed in this Article. This statute
(the second prong of the definition of “knowledge”) states on its face
that the jury can find actual knowledge based on constructive
knowledge, and that is unconstitutional, as previously explained.
B.

The Criminal Washington Pattern Jury Instruction Does Not
Remedy the Problem

The WPIC does nothing to remedy this glaring problem. WPIC
§ 10.02 now states the second prong of the definition of “knowledge” as
follows: “[i]f a person has information that would lead a reasonable
person in the same situation to believe that a fact exists, the jury is
permitted but not required to find that he or she acted with knowledge of
that fact.”49

45. Allen, 182 Wash. 2d at 374, 341 P.3d at 273 (emphasis in original).
46. Id. While correctly citing Shipp, the Court misstated the nature of the case in its parenthetical
description of the case: “[a]ccomplice must have actual knowledge that principal was engaging in
the crime eventually charged.” Id. (citing Shipp, 93 Wash. 2d at 517, 610 P.2d at 1322). Shipp did
not involve accomplice liability. Rather, three cases were consolidated for hearing in Shipp. They
involved convictions for (1) knowingly promoting prostitution in both the first and second degrees,
(2) knowingly riding in a stolen car, and (3) attempted rape in the second degree and knowing
assault with intent to commit rape (second-degree assault). Shipp, 93 Wash. 2d at 512–13, 610 P.2d
at 1324.
47. Allen, 182 Wash. 2d at 374, 341 P.3d at 273 (emphasis in original).
48. Id. (quoting WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.08.010(1)(b)(ii)).
49. 11 WASH. PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS: CRIMINAL § 10.02 (2014) (emphasis added).
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This instruction essentially states that the jury can find that a person
acted with knowledge of a fact if that person has information that would
lead a reasonable person in the same situation to believe that that fact
exists. But that is the very thing that Shipp and Allen hold to be
impermissible, and therefore this instruction does not solve the problem
addressed in those cases. Taken literally, the WPIC instruction does
exactly what these cases, and any ordinary and commonsense
understanding of the concept of knowledge, say cannot be done. The
instruction allows the jury to find knowledge based on a constructive
knowledge (reasonable person) standard even if the jury does not find
that the defendant acted with actual or subjective knowledge. It does not
say anything about the fact that the jury is required to find actual or
subjective knowledge.
In State v. Leech,50 the Washington State Supreme Court held that the
WPIC instruction is consistent with Shipp.51 Nevertheless, the holding of
Leech is highly problematic. Neither Leech nor any of the other cases
explains how its holding squares with Shipp, and it does not, in fact,
square with Shipp. The Leech Court never addressed the fact that the
State must prove that the defendant had actual, subjective knowledge of
the fact in question in order to prove the element of knowledge.
This problem can be traced, in part, to a logical fallacy first
introduced into this body of law in State v. Davis.52 In that case, the
court of appeals affirmed the use of WPIC § 10.02 as it describes the
second prong of the definition of “knowledge.” The court held that
WPIC § 10.02 complies with Shipp, and stated “[c]ontrary to
defendant’s assertion, the instruction allowed the jury to consider the
subjective intelligence or mental condition of the defendant.”53 But the
fact that the instruction allows the jury to consider the subjective
intelligence or mental condition of the defendant is not the problem. The
problem is that in order to find knowledge, the jury must find subjective
knowledge. Regrettably, WPIC § 10.02 also allows the jury not to
consider the subjective knowledge of the defendant, and this is clearly
contrary to Shipp and Allen.

50. 114 Wash. 2d 700, 790 P.2d 160 (1990).
51. Id. at 710, 790 P.2d at 165. In addition, the Leech Court cites numerous other cases
upholding the WPIC instruction as constitutional. Id. at 710 n.20, 790 P.2d at 165 n.20. The Leech
Court states, without any meaningful analysis, that the trial court’s definition of knowledge
instruction in WPIC § 10.02 “avoids the due process problem identified in Shipp; it was not
unconstitutional.” Id. at 710, 790 P.2d at 165.
52. 39 Wash. App. 916, 696 P.2d 627 (1985).
53. Id. at 919–20, 696 P.2d at 629 (emphasis added).
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The fallacy in Davis is perpetuated in the other cases cited by the
Washington State Supreme Court in footnote twenty of the Leech
opinion,54 and has become entrenched in the law. It is time to call a halt
to any further use of this faulty reasoning. The defects in the second
prong of the definition of “knowledge”55 and WPIC § 10.02, as outlined
in this Article, can lead to unjust and unconstitutional convictions. Jurors
reading the instruction literally can reasonably conclude that they are
permitted to find that the defendant acted knowingly if a reasonable
person would have acted knowingly under the circumstances. In the
absence of an improper closing argument by the prosecutor explicitly
stating that the jury can find knowledge based on this objective standard,
as happened in Allen, there is no remedy for a conviction based on such
a result under current case law.
II.

ONE CANNOT KNOW A FALSE PROPOSITION EVEN IF
ONE BELIEVES THE PROPOSITION TO BE TRUE

We have seen that the second prong of the definition of “knowledge”
in the Criminal Code is defective on its face, and has led to erroneous
legal reasoning. As outlined above, the Washington cases do not give
proper attention to the requirement that a defendant have actual,
subjective knowledge in order to be convicted of a crime in which
“knowledge” is an element. It is not enough that a reasonable person in
the same situation as the defendant would have had such actual
knowledge. The WPIC on the definition of “knowledge” does not
remedy this problem.
The second prong of the definition of “knowledge” has led to other
problems as well. In State v. Johnson,56 the State charged the defendant
with the crime of promoting prostitution. The Washington Criminal
Code defines this crime as follows: “[a] person is guilty of promoting
prostitution if, having possession or control of premises which he or she
knows are being used for prostitution purposes, he or she fails without
lawful excuse to make reasonable effort to halt or abate such use.”57 The
Washington State Supreme Court upheld the defendant’s conviction for
promoting prostitution, holding that the defendant knowingly allowed
her premises to be used for prostitution purposes, even though the
premises in question were not actually being used for prostitution
54.
55.
56.
57.

Leech, 114 Wash. 2d at 710, 790 P.2d at 165.
WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.08.010(1)(b)(ii) (2014 & Supp. 2015).
119 Wash. 2d 167, 829 P.2d 1082 (1992).
WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.88.090(1) (emphasis added).
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purposes.58 Rather, the defendant had been arrested pursuant to a sting
operation in which undercover police officers posed as prostitute and
patron.59
The Johnson Court cited the second prong of the definition of
“knowledge,” and stated that “the Legislature has chosen to define
knowledge so that one may ‘know’ something based upon a reasonable,
subjective belief that a fact exists.”60 In response to the defendant’s
argument that one’s mistaken, reasonable, subjective belief is akin to an
impermissible constructive knowledge standard invalidated in Shipp, the
Court stated that “Shipp understood that actual knowledge included
one’s subjective belief,”61 and that the “fact that one’s subjective belief
may be inaccurate is not equivalent to a presumption of knowledge.”62
The Court concluded:
Shipp held that there cannot be a mandatory presumption of
knowledge based upon one’s receipt of certain information
because it would not allow a jury to take into account the
subjective intelligence or mental condition of the defendant.
Shipp, however, does permit a jury to find actual knowledge
from a subjective belief based on circumstantial evidence. It is
the defendant’s subjective belief that is important for culpability,
not the objective state of facts. The jury is permitted to find
actual subjective knowledge if there is sufficient information
which would lead a reasonable person to believe that a fact
exists. Therefore, a mistaken reasonable, subjective belief may
constitute “knowledge” without violating Shipp.63
The Court is correct in stating that a jury is permitted to find actual
knowledge based on circumstantial evidence, and that it is the
defendant’s subjective belief that is important for culpability, at least to
the extent that the defendant must subjectively believe that the fact in
question exists. But the remainder of the Court’s analysis is erroneous.64
First, the Court misconstrues the holding in Shipp, as other courts have
done, in stating that the jury is permitted to find actual subjective
knowledge if there is sufficient information which would lead a
58. Johnson, 119 Wash. 2d at 174, 829 P.2d at 1085.
59. Id. at 169, 829 P.2d at 1083.
60. Id. at 174, 829 P.2d at 1085.
61. Id. (citing State v. Shipp, 93 Wash. 2d 510, 517, 610 P.2d 1322, 1326 (1980)).
62. Id. at 174, 829 P.2d at 1085.
63. Id. at 174, 829 P.2d at 1805–86 (emphasis in original).
64. Only one member of the Washington State Supreme Court that decided Johnson remains on
the Court today, Justice Charles W. Johnson. Justice Johnson correctly dissented in Johnson.
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reasonable person to believe that a fact exists.65 As previously explained,
Shipp holds that the jury must find that the defendant had actual,
subjective knowledge in order to find that he or she acted with
knowledge.
Second, the Court introduces a new fallacy into the discussion by
stating that a mistaken reasonable subjective belief can result in
culpability.66 On the contrary, the definition of “knowledge” requires
awareness of a “fact, facts, or circumstances or result described by a
statute defining an offense.”67 One cannot have knowledge for purposes
of the Criminal Code unless one is aware of a fact. If a person has a
mistaken belief concerning a supposed fact, then by definition, the
person does not have knowledge. This is also consistent with the
ordinary meaning of the term “knowledge” as (justified) true belief.68
The Court in Johnson waxed philosophical in its reasoning, citing an
example in which a person can reasonably believe that by flicking a light
switch, the light will come on. Yet, if there is a fault in the wiring, the
light will not come on.69 The Court stated that under these
circumstances, “we believe or subjectively ‘know’ the switch will turn
the lights on even though it is objectively impossible, until we obtain
information that the wiring is faulty, i.e., by flicking the switch and the
lights remain off.”70 The Court’s quotation marks around the word
“know” are telling. We do not, in fact, know something just because we
reasonably believe it to be the case. In order to have knowledge, the fact
we purport to know must be true. More to the point of this Article, the
definition of “knowledge” in the Criminal Code requires awareness of a
fact, not what someone believes to be a fact. The Johnson case is yet
another instance in which the second prong of the definition of
“knowledge” has led to erroneous reasoning and, in that case at least, a

65. See, e.g., Johnson, 119 Wash. 2d at 174, 829 P.2d at 1085–86.
66. See id. at 174, 829 P.2d at 1086.
67. WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.08.010(1)(b)(i) (2014 & Supp. 2015) (emphasis added).
68. To be charitable, perhaps one interpretation of the court’s reasoning is that under the second
prong of the definition of “knowledge,” a reasonable person could believe that the relevant facts
exist, even though they did not exist and the person’s belief was mistaken, and still have knowledge.
Any such interpretation would be erroneous, however. The first prong of the definition of
“knowledge” clearly requires awareness of an actual fact, and the two parts of the statute must
considered as a whole, with all its provisions considered in relation to one another. See State v.
Bunker, 169 Wash. 2d 571, 578, 238 P.3d 487, 491 (2010). Moreover, even assuming, for the sake
of argument, that the statute is ambiguous in this regard, any such interpretation would violate the
rule of lenity. See, e.g., State v. McGee, 122 Wash. 2d 783, 787, 864 P.2d 912, 913–14 (1993).
69. Johnson, 119 Wash. 2d at 173, 829 P.2d at 1086.
70. Id.
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wrongful conviction.71
III. THE LEGISLATURE SHOULD REPEAL THE SECOND
PRONG OF “KNOWLEDGE,” AND THE JURY
INSTRUCTIONS COMMITTEE SHOULD AMEND THE JURY
INSTRUCTION
Voltaire once said that the “the Holy Roman Empire was neither holy,
nor Roman, nor an empire.”72 By the same token, the longstanding
definition of “knowledge” is (justified) true belief. But under current
Washington case law and the pattern jury instruction defining the second
prong of “knowledge,” a defendant can be held to have knowledge of a
given fact (1) even though he or she did not believe the fact to be true,73
and (2) even though the supposed “fact” was not even true!74 This flies
in the face of the first prong of the definition of “knowledge” set forth in
the Washington Criminal Code,75 fundamental constitutional principles
under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment as they
relate to the second prong of the definition of “knowledge,”76 and the
common understanding of the concept of “knowledge” generally. It is
not too much to ask that the law, and particularly the criminal law where
liberty is at stake, be logical and reasonable.
The Legislature should remedy these problems by eliminating the
second prong of the definition of “knowledge” in the Criminal Code
altogether. After all, what is wrong with defining “knowledge” in
accordance with the first prong of the definition? As is constitutionally
required, this definition simply requires that the defendant have
awareness of the fact in question (true belief) in order to have
knowledge. There is nothing to be gained by adding a second definition
that talks about what a reasonable person might believe about a fact in
question. In order for any such second definition to be constitutional, it
would have to make reference in some manner to the fact that the
71. Even though the defendant could not properly have been convicted of promoting prostitution
under the facts in Johnson, she could have been charged with and convicted of attempted promoting
prostitution. See WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.28.020(2) (“If the conduct in which a person engages
otherwise constitutes an attempt to commit a crime, it is no defense to a prosecution of such attempt
that the crime charged to have been attempted was, under the attendant circumstances, factually or
legally impossible of commission.”).
72. OXFORD DICTIONARY OF QUOTATIONS 716 (Angela Partington ed., 4th ed. 1992).
73. See supra Section I.A.
74. See supra Part II.
75. WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.08.010(1)(b)(i).
76. Id. § 9A.08.010(1)(b)(ii).
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defendant must still have actual, subjective knowledge, which is
required in the first definition anyway.
Even if the Legislature does not repeal the second prong of the
definition of “knowledge,” the Washington Supreme Court Committee
on Jury Instructions should amend WPIC § 10.02 to eliminate the
second paragraph thereof, which makes reference to the unconstitutional
reasonable person standard in defining “knowledge,” or else amend it to
include a requirement that the defendant must in any event act with
actual, subjective knowledge. The Washington State Supreme Court
should also reexamine, in an appropriate case, State v. Leech, State v.
Johnson, and other problematic cases to rectify these problems.
CONCLUSION
The second prong of the definition of “knowledge” in Washington’s
Criminal Code sets forth an unconstitutional negligence standard. WPIC
§ 10.02 further complicates the problem. The Legislature should repeal
the second prong of the definition of “knowledge” in the Criminal Code.
Absent such a repeal, the jury instructions committee should amend
WPIC § 10.02 to eliminate the potential for juries to find “knowledge”
based on constructive knowledge. Until this happens, there is a
substantial risk that juries will wrongly find defendants guilty of crimes
based on constructive knowledge, rather than based on their true belief,
as constitutionally required.

